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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Putin's whipping boy  
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's two-year anniversary passed with the 
often "soon-to-be-fired" PM still in office; it has become apparent that Kasyanov 
possesses some staying power that eludes all but President Vladimir Putin 
himself. Kasyanov is a member of the Kremlin power faction known as the 
Yel'tsin "Family," while Putin has created his own faction, known as the St. 
Petersburg group. Since Putin entered office, a political battle of appointments 
and prosecutions has been waged, centered on replacing the "Family" with 
members of the St. Petersburg group. One need look only at the notorious cases 
developed against the self-exiled Boris Berezovsky and ousted Railways Minister 
Nikolai Aksenyenko for two high-profile examples. However, Kasyanov seems to 
defy these political tremors, remaining in office despite almost continual 
predictions of his downfall. 
 
These rumors increased in volume following Kasyanov's economic forecasts 
(preceding President Putin's address before parliament), which were not as 
optimistic as Putin desired. At his two-year anniversary speech, Kasyanov 
referred to an annual GDP growth rate in the realm of 3.5%, far below Putin's call 
for growth rates of 8-10%. (VERSTY, 18 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) In fact, some of the newspapers have gone so far as to predict who 
will replace Kasyanov. However, his seemingly inevitable dismissal may not 
come as quickly as some expect.  
 
Kasyanov's low forecasts actually benefit Putin: If growth rates actually turn out 
to be low, then it is better for someone outside Putin's inner circle to have been 
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the messenger bearing bad news. It would allow the president to criticize 
Kasyanov rather than one of his own fellow St. Petersburgers. If the focus of 
criticism were to shift to Putin's own group, then the president would become 
increasingly unable to avoid accountability for his policies, or lack thereof. Thus, 
ironically, Kasyanov's staying power in the highly vulnerable position of prime 
minister well may be due to his own distance from Putin's inner circle. Only if the 
economic situation in Russia were to improve would he have to worry about his 
position; once it is credit rather than criticism that will have to be spread around, 
Putin may find Kasyanov no longer useful. Moreover, the role of prime minister 
(chairman of the Council of Ministers), which was an important position to groom 
Yel'tsin's successor, has declined since Putin took office, since most expect Putin 
to seek and win a second term as president. 
 
Meanwhile, President Putin will seek economic advice from organizations such 
as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). This quasi-
governmental lobbying group allows Putin to consult with industrial leaders and 
influential business interests in a consolidated fashion, bringing together various 
oligarchs. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) If, in coordination with this power group, Putin can create a viable 
alternative economic program to present to voters two years from now, he may 
be able to slap down Kasyanov and any other putative rivals. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
FSB to head investigation into Dagestan blast  
In the immediate aftermath of the 9 May blast which rocked the Victory Day 
Parade in Kaspyisk, Dagestan, killing 41 persons and wounding over 100, 
President Vladimir Putin summoned senior security officials, including Interior 
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Minister Boris Gryzlov, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and FSB Director Nikolai 
Patrushev to an emergency meeting at the Kremlin.  
 
In an unscheduled public broadcast following the meeting, the president outlined 
the proceedings he had set in motion. Putin stated that he had ordered a 
coordinated inquiry to be undertaken, but that, since there could be no doubt that 
the blast constituted an act of terrorism, the investigation would be led by the 
FSB and its director. (RUSSIA TV, 9 May 02; BBC MONITORING, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Moreover, Putin revealed that he had ordered 
Patrushev to travel to Dagestan to supervise the case personally, and to ensure 
that the investigation be prosecuted as quickly as possible.  
 
Both Patrushev and Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgirei Magomed-tagirov voiced 
strong suspicions of Wahhabi involvement in this latest terrorist incident. 
Magomed-tagirov blamed Rappani Khalilov, an ethnic Lak from Dagestan, 
adding that "as Interior Minister, I swear that he will be either seized or 
eliminated." (ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 13 May 02) Patrushev preferred to err 
on the side of caution, stating only that the bomb "may be the result of events 
taking place on the territory of Chechnya." (INTERFAX, 13 May 02; via St. 
Petersburg Times) 
 
Since the explosion, the investigation has proceeded with surprising speed. Prior 
to his return to Moscow, Patrushev released details about the explosive device. 
He revealed that the device had consisted of a standard Russian Army M-50 
landmine, "reinforced by sticks of explosives" (ORT, 10 May 02; BBC Monitoring, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database), and "filled with scraps of steel." (ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, 13 May 02) Patrushev added that a composite photo of 
the men suspected of planting the device had been disseminated to law 
enforcement agencies, and on 12 May, it emerged that three brothers, Artur, 
Shamil and Zaur Manaev had been arrested in St. Petersburg in connection with 
the blast. The three later were cleared of these charges, but remain in custody on 
 4 
suspicion of involvement in other incidents. (BBC NEWS, 12 May 2002; via 
www.bbc.co.uk/news)  
 
The rapidity with which the finger of blame is being pointed is disconcerting, 
especially since there are indications that the bomb may have been politically 
motivated, rather than directed against Russian involvement in the Caucasus 
(See Caucasus section of THE NIS OBSERVED by Miriam Lanskoy), and since 
Putin's spokesman and envoy to the Southern Federal District, Viktor Kazantsev, 
urged the Russian public not to jump to the conclusion that the Chechen 
campaign was the motivation behind the attack. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 10 May 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
More interesting still are statements made in Nezavisimaya gazeta by Khizri 
Shikhsaidov, chairman of the government of Dagestan, and Mukhu Aliev, 
chairman of parliament, that the bombing had been made possible by gross 
dereliction of duty on the part of security agencies, and because there are 
"traitors in the law enforcement agencies." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 14 May 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) According to reporter Sergei Antonov, 
the result of such allegations could be wide-ranging staff changes among law 
enforcement and counterintelligence agencies. 
 
President Putin's own statement, made from the Black Sea resort of Sochi on 17 
May, hints that contentions of such a failure may already be coming to light 
among the St. Petersburgers. Putin stated that the nation's "defense and security 
structures should be on permanent high alert, as any negligence here can result 
in a lot of casualties." (INTERFAX, 17 May 02; via The Moscow Times) Whether 
these accusations are proven, and what action will be taken as a result by Putin 
and Patrushev, remains to be seen. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Two is the loneliest number  
The recent rift between Communist Party Chairman Gennady Zyuganov and 
State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev has now extended into regional 
elections, and not just any elections, but the gubernatorial elections in the 
Smolensk Oblast' -- the self-proclaimed "buckle" on the "Red Belt" of the Russian 
Federation. Zyuganov and the local Communists supported incumbent Aleksandr 
Prokhorov, while Seleznev's Rossiya movement placed its weight behind 
General Viktor Maslov, the leader of the oblast's Federal Security Service (FSB) 
department. 
 
Prokhorov also claimed to have Russian President Vladimir Putin's support, 
recalling that, on 22 April, the president personally congratulated him on his 
birthday and wished him luck in the election. He used a photograph of President 
Putin shaking his hand and the slogan "Putin - Prokhorov: Together - Ahead" as 
one his main campaign pictures. (KOMMERSANT, 20 May 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Presidential Plenipotentiary to the Central Federal District 
Georgy Poltachenko refuted that connection: "Such rumors are absurd! Neither I, 
nor the presidential administration, nor the President himself support Prokhorov 
in the campaign. At the last meeting of the State Council Vladimir Putin simply 
congratulated the governors of the Vladimir and Smolensk Oblast', according to 
the tradition. He did not give them awards, but only the protocol gifts: a 
presidential watch and a bouquet of flowers." 
 
It comes as no surprise that the Kremlin favorite is the FSB general and that 
Maslov's position guarantees him the backing of the regional security services; 
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Viktor Maslov also secured the support of the region's largest enterprises, 
including the Smolensk nuclear energy plant, the Smolenskenergo Heat and 
Power Plant, and the Kristall diamond polishing company, which have clashed 
several times with the incumbent. (KOMMERSANT, 14 May 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Seleznev's endorsement, however, played a very important 
role: appealing to the largely left-wing population.  
 
As a Communist, Prokhorov counted on the general political sentiments in the 
oblast' to keep the vote in his favor. After all, four years ago he won by a 
"confident" 41 percent running against former oblast' Governor Glushenkov, who 
was supported by the central authorities. (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 19 May 98; 
via Johnson's Russia List) Of course, nowadays, the Communists aren't what 
they used to be, and the center is stronger than it could have hoped to be under 
Boris Yel'tsin. This year it was Maslov who gathered 41 percent of the vote, while 
Prokhorov received only 35 percent. (NTVRU, 20 May 02; via www.ntvru.com) 
 
This communist tradition in the region made the conflict between Zyuganov and 
Seleznev particularly painful and it is not unlikely that the conflict will affect the 
decision about Seleznev's party membership that is expected to be made at the 
Communist Party Moscow City Committee's plenary meeting later this month. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1219 GMT, 7 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0507, via World News 
Connection) 
 
REGIONS  
Mixing business and pleasure . . .  
The political rivalry in the elections, however, has been overshadowed by much 
louder clashes. The issue at the heart of the campaign is the fight against 
corruption. The governor holds the FSB, the interior ministry, and the 
prosecutor's office responsible for crime and corruption in the region, declaring 
that they are too busy playing politics to fight crime. The power organs accuse 
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the governor and oblast' administration of sustaining the criminal groups. 
(KOMMERSANT, 14 and 20 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
The general prosecutor's office has been after Prokhorov for almost a year. On 
16 August 2001, Prokhorov was summoned to testify about the disappearance of 
274 million rubles earmarked for the reconstruction of the Old Smolensk Road. A 
few months later, the office opened criminal cases against several members of 
the administration under Chapter 1, Article 285, abuse of office, and pursuit of 
personal gain or other interests. And in February 2002, the prosecutor signed an 
order for the arrest of former Deputy Governor Yuri Balashkin, who fled, but was 
later reported to be in Moscow doing business and maintaining contact with 
Prokhorov. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 16 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
 
...and Molotov cocktails  
Prokhorov and his men have allegations of their own: They hold Maslov 
responsible for the fires that burnt down the dachas of two employees of 
Prokhorov's election campaign, the mugging of another member of the election 
campaign, the assault against the son of the campaign's lawyer, and the 
explosion that rocked the former governor's campaign headquarters on 27 April. 
(KOMMERSANT, 14 May 02, and RIA, 0652 GMT, 27 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
A few days before the elections, things really heated up. On 16 May, an 
assassination attempt was made on Prokhorov's deputy, Anatoly Makarenko, as 
he was traveling to his office together with his five-year-old daughter. The deputy 
governor received only a slight hand wound, and his daughter was not hurt, but 
the driver was killed and the bodyguard seriously wounded. The oblast' 
administration immediately accused Maslov of masterminding the assassination, 
but the FSB general insisted that Makarenko had nothing to do with the elections, 
or with politics in general, and suggested that it was Makarenko's economic 
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machinations and commercial ventures (the incentive for Makarenko's entry to 
the political post) that invited retribution. Maslov also noted that it was possible 
that the assassination attempt was a pre-election stunt: "The team playing 
against me," the FSB general declared, "for them, the death of a man is nothing 
in comparison to the [prospect] of victory." Representatives from Maslov's 
headquarters even claimed to have an eyewitness -- a journalist from (Kremlin-
controlled) RTR Television Channel -- who said that Makarenko and his daughter 
were in one car, while another car, carrying Makarenko's bodyguard and driver 
was targeted. (KOMMERSANT, 20 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
The latter version seems to have little credibility: Not only did all media sources 
reporting at the time of the incident mention just one car, but it was also stated 
that Makarenko himself received a slight wound to his hand. (NTVRU, 16 May 
02; via www.ntvru.com) 
 
Maslov's PR men also dismissed the other accusations of sabotage. There were 
rumors, for example, that expensive equipment like computers was removed 
from Prokhorov's campaign headquarters before the explosion and returned 
afterwards. (KOMMERSANT, 20 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
 
Since the power organs that could conduct investigations into such events also 
have a personal stake in the findings of the investigations, it is unlikely that 
answers -- correct answers that is -- will be revealed. These answers, however, 
are not that important. What does count is that such campaigns can be carried 
out; that voter turnout was 55 percent and that less than 10 percent voted 
"against all candidates"; and that the electorate is unfazed by assassination 
attempts, explosions, robberies and assaults and continues to vote for the lesser 
of evils. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
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By Scott Bethel 
 
Arms negotiations, part II  
Following agreements initiated at the Crawford Summit between Presidents Putin 
and Bush in November 2001, Russian and US negotiators recently completed 
the second round of talks on strategic arms reduction. At issue was the actual 
number of strategic weapons each country will maintain, as well as verification 
questions surrounding the future of strategic weapons. (ITAR-TASS, 1330 GMT, 
24 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) Treaty of 1991, still in effect, was 
envisaged only as the beginning of the reduction effort and was aimed primarily 
at reducing the number of nuclear warheads from a Cold War high of between 
11,000 and 12,000 down to 6,000 to 7,000 for each side. (US DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE; via usinfo.state.gov) Now, the US and Russia have agreed in principle to 
lower the ceiling to between 1,700 and 2,200 each. However, other issues have 
moved into focus:  
 
The defense ministry's ability to maintain its nuclear weapons in stable working 
order, as well as Moscow's ability to make a full accounting of its weapons, have 
long been doubted. (Public Broadcasting, FRONTLINE: RUSSIAN ROULETTE, 
Aug 99; via www.pbs.org/wgbh) There have been several failures within the 
command and control structure of the Russian strategic forces. The Russians 
have neither the resources nor the desire to solve these endemic problems within 
their strategic arsenal and US leaders have expressed concern over the state of 
Russia's forces. (US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 Aug 01; via 
usnews.com) Additionally, there have been several reported (and an 
undetermined number of unreported) thefts of nuclear materials from Russian 
locations. (SPACE DAILY, 23 Feb 02; via www.spacedaily.com/news) The 
insecurity of the Russian arsenal coupled with the expense of maintaining 
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strategic weapons in both countries has created a desire for reductions on both 
sides.  
 
During a recent call-in show on Russian TV, the Russian negotiator, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, stressed that, "The main moments this 
agreement should reflect [concern] . . .the connection between strategic offensive 
and defensive weapons." [RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV (ORT), 1930 GMT, 24 Apr 02; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database] Privately, the Russians acknowledge that, in 
the long run, they will have a difficult time opposing the US National Missile 
Defense (NMD) program. (SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 16 Feb 02; via 
www.sciam.com) Moscow's approach seems to be that, if it allows the NMD 
program to continue with minimal objections, the US will provide increased 
assistance for the maintenance of Moscow's arsenal and the destruction of 
superfluous warheads. (INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Dec 01; via 
www.ieer.org/russian/pubs) 
 
The issue of verification presents a major challenge, given concerns over the 
safety and security of the Russian arsenal and Moscow's paranoia regarding 
external inspection of areas in which problems might be detected. Historically, 
Russia (and, earlier, the Soviet Union) has sought to conceal weaknesses of the 
Russian military. The protection of strategic weapons, accountability and 
installation security constitute areas in which the Russian military does not excel. 
However, effective measures to ensure destruction and/or proper care for 
nuclear capabilities clearly are needed. Russian military leaders have expressed 
a willingness to allow inspectors into installations and, where possible, to observe 
destruction procedures. (Public Broadcasting, FRONTLINE: RUSSIAN 
ROULETTE, Aug 99; via www.pbs.org/wgbh) These processes will be part of the 
details to be finalized. 
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Russia and the US are struggling to chart a new course for arms control, 
including the focus of future agreements, whether additional cuts will be based 
on a specific single number or will continue to evolve, and whether strategic arms 
talks should provide a springboard for additional arms reduction and other 
strategic discussions. [RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV (ORT), 1930 GMT, 24 Apr 02; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database] 
 
Caspian summit  
The heads of the Caspian Sea states (Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Russia) met on 23 and 24 April in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan to 
determine some guidelines for the shared use of the vast resources of the 
Caspian basin. Not surprisingly, there was little by way of concrete agreements 
and much by way of rhetoric and bluster. However, the first meeting revealed 
some of the dynamics of the issues surrounding the use of the Caspian, including 
access to its natural resources and transportation. (RUSSIA TV, 1300 GMT, 24 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Significantly, for the first time, the 
head of state of each of the Caspian countries led his own delegation. 
 
There appeared to be substantial conflict among the delegations. Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan are locked in a bitter dispute over the future of several 
exploratory wells in the center of the sea. (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Apr 02; via 
www.moscowtimes.ru) Iran is claiming a share of all Caspian resources (as 
opposed to being limited to its own geographical sector) and Russia is trying to 
re-assert its hegemonial position. The five delegations issued a vague 
declaration calling for the "prevention of conflict and behind-the-scenes games." 
(RUSSIA TV, 1300 GMT, 24 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Three weeks later, however, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed on a line of 
demarcation between their sectors. This opens the way for more active 
exploitation by Russian companies and the construction of another pipeline to 
Russia. 
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Ivanov confirms policy objectives  
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov outlined the priorities for Russian foreign policy 
during a recent speech at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations 
(MGIMO). (ITAR-TASS, 0813 GMT, 26 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
First, he said, Russian foreign policy is that of a global partner rather than a Cold 
War enemy, with an aim "to ensure strategic stability in the world." This goal is 
reflected, Ivanov said, in the overt role Russia is playing in the "war on terrorism" 
and in being part of the solution in the Middle East. The Russian foreign policy 
team has made every effort to continue to play an active role in world crises. 
 
A second goal is to "consolidate Russian security and that of its CIS partners in 
the face of global challenges and threats." The Russians still behave like regional 
hegemonial leaders and expect to be consulted in matters of regional security. 
The United States has appeared to collude in Russia's pretensions by going 
through the motions of consulting Moscow on Central Asia's role in the "war on 
terrorism," and by involving Putin and Ivanov in major policy decisions with 
regional implications.  
 
A third aim, Ivanov said, is to "make further steps towards integration with 
Europe." Much of President Putin's efforts are focused on increasing the 
relationship with European powers. Russia has long sought (even before Putin) 
to be considered a European power. In pursuit of this goal, Moscow has 
appealed regularly to the European Union for membership and, since the events 
of 11 September, has been courted openly by European NATO officials. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
By Scott Bethel 
 
New fighters for Russia  
Russia rolled out the MiG-29M2 for the first time at the Berlin Airshow. The new 
variant of Russia's answer to the US F-16 fighter has shown some marketing 
promise in the developing countries. (ITAR-TASS, 0838 GMT, 25 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) The MiG-29 has proven to be Russia's most 
attractive fighter aircraft export item, and currently is in use in more than 19 
countries. Furthermore, it has proven successful in co-production ventures in 
China and India. 
 
The new variant will possess an all-weather, day/night capability and the ability to 
employ precision-guided ordnance effectively. The M2 variant also will be able to 
fly safely at low altitudes (less than 100 ft) and to employ weapons while 
engaged on various high g-force maneuvers.  
 
The M2 represents the next level for the venerable MiG-29 which, in head-to-
head competition with the US F-16 and F/A-18 fighters, has always fallen short in 
poor weather and visibility. It appears that MiG engineers have addressed these 
problems. However, only time and performance tests can validate these claims. 
In any case, MiG seems to have made its premier fighter more competitive 
against Western offerings. 
 
The timing of these improvements, if they prove to be genuine, could not be 
better. Russia has just been offered the opportunity to have its jets compete 
against US aircraft for sale in Argentina. In addition, other countries -- including 
Myanmar, Iran, North Korea and Indonesia -- are just beginning to compete for 
upgrades in their fighter inventories. 
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At the same time, Russian engineers at the Sukhoi design bureau are preparing 
to introduce a fifth-generation fighter suitable for competition against the US Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF). The new Russian aircraft is supposed to have some of the 
same performance characteristics as the JSF, including stealth, vectored thrust 
and advanced weapons capabilities. (ITAR-TASS, 0909 GMT, 27 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Though the new fighter is still in the design phase, 
Mikhail Pogosyan, managing director of Sukhoi, said that "the development 
should be conducted with a view of achieving a reasonable combat efficiency, 
and take into account market demand." (RIA NEWS AGENCY, 1006 GMT, 27 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Pogosyan made it clear that this 
fighter was to be marketed for export and not just for the Russian Air Force. 
 
It is unlikely that the new Russian fighter will be truly competitive against the JSF. 
However, it is doubtful that the JSF will be widely exported, at least initially. 
(JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 19 Oct 01; via www.janes.uk) For the Russians to 
be attempting the technology leap required even to be considered alongside the 
JSF would constitute an extraordinary achievement.  
 
Though capable of turning out an adequate product, both Sukhoi and MiG would 
be hard-pressed to meet the technologies the US can field in its fighter force right 
now. As a result, it is more likely that both design bureaus will put the lion's share 
of money toward bread and butter programs, like the MiG-29 and Su-27. These 
proven airframes, which have stood the test of time, could prove to be long-term 
money earners. Nevertheless, the Russian government, apparently working in 
the belief that new airframes could bring in more capital, have committed 
additional funds to Sukhoi to develop the new fighter. (ITAR-TASS, 0909 GMT, 
27 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Putin and the Caspian Fleet  
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President Vladimir Putin conducted an all-day inspection of the Russian Caspian 
Fleet on 25 April. His first order of business was to challenge the Caspian flotilla 
to conduct realistic exercises this summer. (RUSSIA TV, 1000 GMT, 27 Apr 02; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) "During the last 10 years we have not had a 
chance to check [the flotilla] in reality and in conditions close-to-combat...," Putin 
said. He identified the objective as a test to "defend Russia's national interests, 
combat drug trafficking, and to carry out a rescue operation." (RADIO MAYAK, 
0900 GMT, 28 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) However, this 
exercise cannot but send a clear signal to other Caspian littoral countries. Last 
year, the Caspian flotilla conducted exercises off Azerbaijan's coast near Baku.  
 
Even prior to the Ashgabat negotiations in April, it was clear to other Caspian 
leaders that Moscow's influence might be exerted through military force if 
necessary. (CENTRAL ASIA CAUCASUS ANALYST, 27 Mar 02; via 
www.cacianalyst.org/2002-03-27) 
 
The exercise is to feature joint forces. Scheduled to participate are the Russian 
Air Force (in particular the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force), the Border Troops 
and the Air Defense Forces. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Post-election return to foreign policy status quo 
For the past several years, Ukraine-watchers have puzzled over the often-
schizophrenic quality of the country's foreign policy. One moment, the country's 
leaders have proclaimed their desire to be included in Western institutions; the 
next, they have suggested closer integration with their Eastern neighbor, Russia. 
One minute, these leaders have appeared to covet regional power status; the 
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next, they have shrunk from actions that would help them reach that goal. To 
explain these apparent contradictions, officials in Ukraine have talked of a "dual" 
and "bipolar" foreign policy, and suggested that the country's most important goal 
should be "creating a safe zone of peace and stability" around it. Unfortunately, 
this refusal to choose a clear direction for its foreign policy meant that the country 
remained in a type of limbo, hovering ineffectually between East and West, easily 
swayed and manipulated by both sides.  
 
During the recent parliamentary elections, however, it seemed that President 
Leonid Kuchma was all but abandoning this policy and doing his best to shove 
his country in one direction -- toward Russia. Dogged by accusations of his 
complicity in the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and battling the 
Communists for support in ethnically Russian areas of Eastern Ukraine, the 
president repeatedly lashed out at the "West," while seeming to embrace all 
things Russian. The policy shift (which actually began well before the election) 
was, of course, questioned by Western countries and organizations and 
welcomed in the East. Russian politicians were particularly pleased to hear 
Kuchma tell a gathering of ethnic Russians that he would reverse his country's 
earlier position and join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC). That organization, ostensibly meant to promote free trade among 
its members (Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), is often 
viewed by former Soviet republics as a Russian tool to maintain economic 
dominance over them. Kuchma's reservations, it seems, disappeared during the 
elections, at least publicly.  
 
Meanwhile, all talk of joining the European Union (EU) -- once a staple of 
Ukrainian policy -- was also gone. It appeared that Ukraine finally had made a 
foreign policy choice. As is common in Ukraine, however, that was then and this 
is now. Soon after the elections, talk of the European Union began again, while 
Ukraine's leaders suddenly denied any intention to join the EURASEC. "We 
should not forget that joining the EURASEC entails a radical change of our laws," 
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State Secretary for European Integration Oleksandr Chaly said. "This is quite 
another form of market economy." (INTERFAX UKRAINE BUSINESS REPORT, 
19 Apr 02; via lexis-nexis) This backtracking set off a barrage of criticism from 
the Russian Ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who reportedly 
referred to Chaly as "ignorant" and claimed the secretary had no authorization to 
speak on the issue. On 25 April, however, Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko held a 
press conference in order to support Chaly's statement. "No country can be in 
several customs unions or in several unions," he said. "In our case, Ukraine 
chooses the union it prefers. This is the EU. Of course, I think that Viktor 
Stepanovich Chernomyrdin [responded] on the spur of the moment and probably 
did not completely understand the comments made by our state secretary, 
Oleksandr Chaly." (ONE PLUS ONE TV, 1630 GMT, 25 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, 
via lexis-nexis)  
 
But this being Ukraine, the issue was far from settled. Less than 10 days later, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters that Ukraine had requested 
observer status in the EURASEC. He also attempted to provide his neighbor with 
an incentive to become a full member. Should Ukraine join the organization, 
Putin said, oil shipped to the country would be exempt from VAT fees -- fees that 
soon will be raised from $9 per ton to over $20 per ton. Earlier, Russian Prime 
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov asserted that this increase would cost Ukraine an 
extra $170 million each year. (DEN, 11 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) 
Putin claimed the cost could be as high as $450 million. Either way, the VAT 
increase would further strain Ukraine's already taut energy budget. In response 
to Putin's suggestion, Kuchma promised that "more serious steps will soon be 
undertaken" regarding full membership in EURASEC. (INTERFAX, 1608 GMT, 
17 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) The Russian president seems to 
have accepted that statement for the time being and reportedly has suspended 
the VAT increase on oil shipments to Ukraine.  
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This banter over VAT came, not coincidentally, around the same time as 
Kuchma's meeting with EU President Romano Prodi in Brussels. While this 
meeting was important for its symbolism (particularly given Kuchma's recent 
isolation), it was telling that, unlike his own previous statements and those of 
Zlenko's just days earlier, Kuchma denied his country would seek EU 
membership. Instead, he said, Ukraine would work to "achieve the standards of 
the European Union." (UKRAINIAN NEWS AGENCY, 19 May 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Meanwhile, Zlenko was meeting with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. That 
meeting appeared to be more successful, and ended with Powell dismissing 
suggestions that Ukraine had sold a radar system to Iraq in violation of UN 
sanctions. "We have no evidence that they actually have done it," he said. "They 
have assured us that it didn't happen, and so there was no need to mention it 
today." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 16 May 02; via lexis-nexis) The secretary 
also told reporters that Zlenko had implied a desire for his country to join NATO -- 
something the Ukrainian foreign minister has avoided discussing in public. 
Powell's response was apparently cautious but encouraging; clearly, during the 
meeting, the secretary's concerns for the geopolitical situation in the region 
outweighed any concerns about Ukraine's domestic politics.  
 
Kuchma does not seem to suffer from that problem. So, Ukraine continues to 
dangle dangerously between East and West. It does appear, however, that there 
are significant efforts being made to integrate Ukraine more fully into Western 
structures. But this process can only go so far. As long as the country's president 
is weakened by scandal and dependent on Russian support, there can be no true 
West-oriented policy. Additionally, as long as the country remains dependent on 
Russian energy, it will need to remain dependent on Russian political will. 
Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts, Ukraine has been unable to wean itself 
away from the Russian energy trough. And in the last 10 years, Russia has been 
very willing to use its control over its neighbor's energy supply to "convince" 
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Ukraine to support Russia's policies. The VAT debate is just the latest case in 
point. For this reason, while the inclination of many leaders of Ukraine is to lean 
Westward, pragmatically, the country must stay engaged to the East.  
 
The EU and Powell meetings are indeed a positive sign -- as are the recent 
military exercises in Ukraine involving current and future NATO members. 
Probably it will be necessary to wait several more years before the country's 
foreign policy can begin to move in one consistent direction. Only a country that 
is post-Kuchma with a more diversified energy supply will be able truly to choose 
its own independent path. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Reykjavik meeting unproductive  
A trilateral meeting of the Turkish, Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers 
was held in Reykjavik on 15 May. According to Azerbaijani Foreign Minister 
Vilayat Quliev, the question of relations between Armenia and Turkey did not 
come up at the meeting. Quliev said that Ankara has not altered its position that it 
will not resume relations with Yerevan while Armenia continues to occupy parts 
of Azerbaijan. The OSCE has not produced any new initiatives for the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, Quliev added. Likewise a recent three-day consultation 
between the personal representatives of the Azerbaijani and Armenian 
presidents in Prague produced no results. (EKHO, 16 May 02; BBC Monitoring, 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
ARMENIA  
US slaps sanctions on Armenian firm  
The US has imposed sanctions on an Armenian company that is accused of 
selling dual use technology to Iran. An Armenian paper, Aravot, comments that 
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the sanctions "are not so terrible." Only the company in question will be punished 
by being denied US governments aid for two years and it will not be able to 
conclude a contract with the USA or buy defense equipment from the US. "If 
these Armenian companies are indeed private, as Foreign Minister Vardan 
Oskanian hastened to announce, the situation would not be so alarming," Aravot 
continued. The troubling part is that "there are no private companies in Armenia 
delivering equipment to Iran. Although they are called private, they operate under 
the auspices of the authorities, i.e., they are in fact state-run." (ARAVOT, 14 May 
02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis)  
 
The company, Lysine, sold equipment including fermentation tanks to Iran. The 
tanks can be used to produce dangerous microbes for use as biological 
weapons. When the sale was made two years ago, the company was owned by 
Armen Sarkisian, the brother of the late Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen 
Sarkisian. (ARMINFORM NEWS AGENCY, 17 and 18 May 02; BBC Monitoring, 
via lexis-nexis) Lysine manufactures a beet-based biochemical substance used 
as an additive to animal fodder. However, the product also can be used to 
produce proteins that raise resistance to nuclear radiation. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
17 May 02) 
 
It is quite possible that Armenian companies are being used as fronts by Russia, 
since Russian companies have come under greater scrutiny in recent years for 
their sales of sensitive technology to Iran. Armenia, Russia and Iran have formed 
a strategic alliance to coordinate policies in the Caucasus region. Armenia finally 
has achieved its long-sought aim of securing Iran's participation in the 
negotiations concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. An Iranian representative was 
among the OSCE mediators at the most recent meeting of the Minsk group, 
which was held on 13 May. (IRNA, 13 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) 
From Russia's perspective, it can rely on Iran to block Azerbaijan's efforts to 
develop its oil reserves in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan's President Heyder Aliev 
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arrived for a long-awaited visit in Tehran on 18 May. He plans to discuss the 
status of the Caspian Sea, but few expect the talks to be fruitful. 
 
GEORGIA  
Train and equip mission stalls  
Although 20 US trainers had arrived in Georgia and 75 more Rangers were on 
the way, the training stalled due to complications on the Georgian side. The US 
requires that the Georgian soldiers work on a contract basis, although Georgia 
has not switched to a professional military. However, the government says it has 
found the 5 million lari to switch the units in question to a contract basis. 
(GEORGIAN TELEVISION, 16 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) On a 
visit to Georgia, Otar Shalikashvili, who is serving as an adviser to the US 
Defense Department, reminded his hosts that, "The Georgian government is 
helping itself since it is assuming certain financial obligations. We expect your 
government to meet these obligations by entering into special agreements with 
the troops trained by us and paying them adequate salaries." (RUSTAVI-2 TV, 15 
May 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) 
 
INGUSHETIA 
Refugees in Ingushetia in peril 
General Murat Zyazikov won the run-off ballot in Ingushetia's presidential 
elections on 28 April. The FSB general's most recent appointment was as the 
deputy to General Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's representative in the Southern 
Federal District. Kommersant and Ren-TV reported on 29 April that armed 
detachments of FSB and MVD special forces screened potential voters and 
barred the supporters of Zyazikov's rival, State Duma deputy Alikhan 
Amirkhanov, from voting. (BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Zyazikov's supporters had special markings in their internal passports and were 
allowed to pass into the election hall; those lacking such markings were not 
allowed to enter.  
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Immediately after the voting, it became clear why the Kremlin had gone to such 
lengths to elect Zyazikov. The new Ingush president announced that his first 
priority will be to return refugees from Chechnya and North Ossetia who have 
been living in Ingushetia to their places of origin. Plans to repatriate the refugees 
to Chechnya were confirmed on 15 May by Stanislav Ilyasov, the prime minister 
in the pro-Russian government. Ilyasov said that he had discussed this prospect 
with UN representative Terence Burke and had reached agreement with foreign 
diplomats that humanitarian organizations would move from Ingushetia to 
Chechnya. (INTERFAX, 15 May 02; via Chechnya-sl@yahoo.groups.com) 
 
DAGESTAN  
Kapyisk blast: elections by other means  
Officials of the Dagestani security services suspect that Rapani Khalilov, a 
Dagestani Lak, organized the blast in Kaspiysk on 9 May that killed 41 persons. 
(ITAR-TASS, 10 MAY 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
According to ITAR-TASS, Rapani is a Wahhabi who took part in the fighting in 
the fall of 1999, when Dagestani and Chechen militants launched an incursion 
from Chechnya. Police are investigating the possibility that the terrorists were 
aided by local Dagestani police, Ren-TV reported on 10 May. (BBC Monitoring, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The other suspects arrested in connection 
with this case were also natives of Dagestan. 
 
Experts on Dagestan regard the terrorist blast as the start of the new election 
cycle. In fact the pre-election marathon began with the assassination of 
Dagestani policemen in January 2002 and the brief detention of Nadirshah 
Khachilaev, a notorious Lak gangster and former Duma deputy who also took 
part in the 1999 incursions. (INTERFAX, 24 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) Sanobar 
Shermatova, a leading expert on the Caucasus, suggested that the terrorist 
attack in Kaspyisk was carried out to undermine the chairman of the Dagestani 
State Council, Magomedali Magomedov, who will run for a third term in July. 
Writing in Moskovskiye novosti on 13 May, Shermatova pointed out that 
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Magomedov, a Dargin, has ruled the republic for over a decade, embittering the 
Avars, the largest Dagestani nationality, whose candidates are blocked from 
advancing through normal channels.  
 
Magomedov has been at the helm of Dagestani politics since 1987. He should 
have transferred power years ago to a member of one of Dagestan's other 
nationalities; instead he has managed to hold on to office -- first by extending the 
length of his term due to the first Chechen war, and then in 1998 by abolishing 
the ethnic rotation principle enshrined in the constitution. According to 
Shermatova, many Dagestani observers believe that the Avar politicians have 
teamed up with criminal structures and Wahhabi militias to prove to the Kremlin 
that Magomedov cannot control his turf. She also hints that the Avars may have 
the support of Kremlin insider Anatoly Chubais. 
 
For its part, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's government sought to 
distance itself from the events in Dagestan. Chechenpress, the government's 
official news agency, expressed grief and indignation, calling the terrorists 
"scum" and "scoundrels." Chechenpress pointed out that theories about Chechen 
links to terrorist acts in Russian cities often were claimed but never documented. 
The news agency admitted that Maskhadov has not always been able to exercise 
control over other Chechens. However, the Russian political authorities have also 
failed to curb the excesses of some officers serving in Chechnya. 
(CHECHENPRESS, 10 May 02; via Chechnya-sl@yahoo.groups.com) 
 
CHECHNYA  
Who killed Khattab?  
The official version of Khattab's death, that he was killed in a special FSB 
operation involving a poisoned letter, has not convinced all the observers and 
other explanations of Khattab's demise continue to circulate. Sanobar 
Shermatova writes in Moskovskiye novosti on 10 May that Khattab was killed by 
a Jordanian agent who was sent at the behest of diaspora Chechens in the 
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Middle East. Chechens regard the presence of Khattab as among the worst 
calamities that had befallen them and purportedly had decided to eliminate him. 
According to this version, Khattab died in Chechnya in the way that was 
described by the Russian authorities -- but Chechens, not the FSB, ordered his 
assassination. Shermatova comments that Khattab's unit, comprised mostly of 
Arabs, was so estranged from the Chechen units and Chechen society that there 
is nothing surprising in the fact that his death was not widely known. Khattab was 
buried on 18 March, but news of his death became public on 25 April.  
 
Another highly knowledgeable expert, Vyacheslav Izmailov, suggests in Novaya 
gazeta on 13 May that Khattab may not be dead at all. Other terrorists have 
obtained fake passports and moved to neighboring Russian regions. One such 
person is Rezlan El'biev who, among many other crimes, reportedly killed the US 
aid worker Fred Cuny in 1995. According to Izmailov, El'biev lives in Ingushetia 
under a new identity. Izmailov regards as improbable that Khattab's demise could 
have been concealed for a month because he had a Dagestani wife, hence the 
news would have spread through her family. Izmailov raises an important point 
by asking why Basaev did not appear at Khattab's burial, which was captured on 
videotape. 
 
Meanwhile, previously unknown details of Khattab's biography are coming out in 
the Arabic press. According to his brother Mansour, Khattab's real name was 
Samer Saleh Abdullah Al- Sewailem. He was from a very prominent Saudi family 
that originated in the central part of the Arab peninsula. Samer turned down 
offers to study in the US with the Aramco corporation. Instead he went to 
Afghanistan in 1987 equipped with two letters of introduction to the mujahadeen 
(one of them from the Saudi Red Crescent Society in Pakistan). (AL-SHARQ AL-
ASWAT, 2 May 02) He remained in Afghanistan until 1991, then went to 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and finally Chechnya. He remained in regular contact with 
his family in Saudi Arabia via satellite phone but had not visited since 1993. 
Although his family did not approve of his activities, Khattab was always able to 
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persuade them to give him money. When he arrived in Chechnya he had no 
contacts and posed as a journalist to establish himself. Before his arrival in 
Chechnya Khattab already spoke fluent Russian, according to his brother.  
 
According to the Arabic paper, Al-Sharq Al-aswat, Khattab was poisoned by a 
Dagastani messenger, Ibrahim Il-Uri, who was carrying a letter from Abu Valid. 
The fighters who buried Khattab made the tape and sent it by messenger to Abu 
Valid, who decided to keep Khattab's death secret. The Federals seized the 
video during a raid on 23 April, and took credit for Khattab's death on 25 April. 
The idea that the video was made on 18 March for the sake of Khattab's Saudi 
family does not stand up to scrutiny. It is clear from the Al-Sharq Al-aswat 
interview and another article in Al-Hayat on 29 April that the family did not hear 
the news until the end of April. 
 
This version also leaves unanswered questions. Why did Abu Valid need the 
video? Why didn't he attend the burial? Why was Khattab's death kept a secret 
for a month even from his family? This suggests the possibility that Khattab may 
have been killed by his men on their own initiative.  
 
And does it matter?  
Khattab's death has had no particular impact on the war. The routine of fighting 
and "cleansing" continues unabated, and the most serious recent attack, the 
explosion of the bus carrying 18 members of the pro-Moscow Chechen police, 
occurred on 18 April, after Khattab's demise. Khattab has been replaced by Abu 
Valid, who is regarded as an equally unsavory character; Valid has inherited 
Khattab's Saudi financial sponsors. As Pavel Felgenhauer commented in the 10 
May issue of Moskovskiye novosti, it does not profit the Russian side to eliminate 
the old guard of Chechen commanders, those who fought in the first war, 
because their replacements are likely to be far more cruel and irreconcilable. 
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Indeed, Abu Valid is busy making a name for himself befitting his mentor's 
mantle. On 16 May, he announced via the radical new service kavkaz-tsentr that 
Russian hostages would be executed in three days unless the Russian forces 
meet a list of his demands -- which is highly improbable. The prisoners in 
question are the crew of the helicopter that disappeared on 3 February. The 
Russian authorities are not engaging in negotiations with Valid, saying that the 
crew is "probably dead" already. (RIA NOVOSTI, 15 May 02; via Chechnya-sl) 
The wreckage of the Mi-24 helicopter was found last month, with no trace of the 
crew. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue and David Montgomery 
 
Uncivil societies  
Despite vast energy resources, economic potential and available labor forces, 
the countries of Central Asia could only be described as failed states, both before 
11 September and since. The crippling socio-economic effects of Communism 
have been, in general, exacerbated in the post-Soviet era by incompetent, 
authoritarian regimes bent more on lining their own pockets than on developing 
their societies, raising the standard of living for their people, and lifting their 
states out of the Stone Age. Worse, however, is the likelihood that the influx of 
foreign capital, personnel and equipment resulting from the "war on terrorism" will 
not change substantively the political, and therefore socio-economic, landscape 
of the region. 
 
Lacking most among the major institutions in the region normally associated with 
a civil society are a free press, free speech (or political opposition), and an 
independent central bank and judiciary. Despite the enormous increase of 
attention that Central Asia has 0enjoyed in recent months, little information has 
reached the mainstream Western media regarding the environmental and health 
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care disasters in the region, the political corruption of the existing regimes, or the 
imprisonment of human rights workers and political activists. Within the Central 
Asian republics, little news reaches citizens that is not screened or even written 
by the government. 
 
So far, development aid and security guarantees have not been tied directly to 
improvements in human rights or substantive steps toward fair, multi-party 
democratic systems. Indeed, if anything, established regimes have cracked down 
on genuine political opposition under the rubric of "fighting terrorism." The plights 
of Ravshan Gapirov, Azimbek Beknazarov and Sherali Nazarkulov (jailed human 
rights activist, imprisoned member of parliament, and dead hunger striker, 
respectively) forcefully illustrate the political and social crises currently facing 
Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev, and are indicative of the state of affairs 
throughout the region. To emphasize the point, recently more than 90 peaceful 
political protesters were arrested in Bishkek, prompting Human Rights Watch 
both to condemn the Akaev regime as "going down the road of intolerance and 
brutality" and to question continued Western support for the government. 
(HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH; 17 May 02; via www.hrw.org) 
 
In a similar attempt at self-preservation in the face of political opposition and 
criticism, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev recently proposed re-
subordinating the financial police directly to the president (thereby eliminating 
any governmental or parliamentary oversight). He put forward plans to establish 
a special authority attached to the presidential office empowered with the 
prevention and supervision of cases of corruption. (THE GLOBE, 16 May 02; via 
www.globe.kz) Perhaps his intent becomes more obvious when one considers 
that recently large sums of Kazakh state monies have surfaced in Swiss bank 
accounts. Nazarbaev has been accused publicly of misappropriating public funds 
and taking bribes from the oil companies (although Prime Minister Imangali 
Tasmaghambetov recently tried to defuse criticism by offering a possible 
explanation for the accounts). In the face of these accusations Nazarbaev may 
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be ill-advised to resort to such measures as rendering the government impotent 
by subjugating the investigators and censoring the investigations.  
 
Whether allegations concerning Nazarbaev's or Akaev's actions, or accusations 
that Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov is trafficking heroin, are 
substantiated or not, a shadow darkens Central Asian regimes and societies.  
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Fear of civil war 
As protests against President Akaev's administration increased, the former 
Kyrgyz defense minister and chairman of the Defense Committee of the 
Legislative Assembly, Myrzakan Subanov, expressed concern that continued 
unrest in the country could result in a civil war following largely the north-south 
division within the country. (INTERFAX, 1034 GMT, 16 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0516, via World News Connection) Kyrgyzstan, being 94 percent mountainous, is 
subject to a geographical political division that is reflected in the political tensions 
and subtle cultural differences between the north -- containing the administrative 
capital of Bishkek -- and the more Uzbek-influenced southern regions -- including 
the centers of Osh and Jalal-Abad. The roots of current protests and the deeper 
threat to the stability of the country stem from north-south tensions and a central 
government that has not addressed the concerns of the country with regional 
equity. 
 
By 16 May, over 8,000 protesters from the south were migrating towards Bishkek 
to express their dissatisfaction with President Askar Akaev's administration. 
(IBID.) Emphasizing the north-south division, upwards of 3,500 protesters 
blockaded the Osh-Bishkek highway, disrupting transit and trade between the 
regions. (ITAR-TASS, 1553 GMT, 16 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0516, via World 
News Connection) Approximately 90 persons in Bishkek were detained by police, 
purportedly for conducting an unauthorized rally (EURASIANET, 17 May 02; via 
www.eurasianet.org); on Monday, 13 May, approximately 100 individuals 
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attempted to break into the Kyrgyz parliament building to express their concerns 
to the deputies. (INTERFAX, 0836 GMT, 13 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0513, via 
World News Connection)  
 
The demands of the protesters reflect the four principal causes of the current 
unrest within the country: 
 
(1) Demands for justice: On 17-18 March, 5 persons were killed and 90 injured in  
clashes between Kerben residents and police. (Kerben is the center of the Aksy 
district in Jalal-Abad Region.) The protesters are demanding that those guilty of 
causing these casualties be punished. (ITAR-TASS, 1841 GMT, 15 May 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0515, World News Connection) 
 
(2) Protests concerning criminal proceedings against Azimbek Beknazarov, 
chairman of the parliamentary committee for judicial and legal issues, who is 
accused of abuse of office while working as a law-enforcement investigator in the 
prosecutor's office of Jalal-Abad Region. His trial contributed to the initial March 
2002 riots in Aksy; protesters are demanding that the case against him be thrown 
out. (ITAR-TASS and INTERFAX, 7 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0507, via World 
News Connection) 
 
(3) Demands for the revocation of the sentence passed on Felix Kulov: On 8 
May, the former governor of Chuy Region (1994-96) and mayor of Bishkek 
(1998-99), Felix Kulov, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for "having damaged 
the state on a large scale." In addition, his property was confiscated and he was 
prohibited from holding government office for three years after his release from 
prison. (INTERFAX, 1530 GMT, 8 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0508, via World 
News Connection) Kulov is the leader of the Ar-Namys opposition party and is 
considered to constitute one of the most serious political threats to Akaev. (ITAR-
TASS, 1126 GMT, 14 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0514, via World News 
Connection) 
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(4) Opposition to the surrender of land to China: In an attempt to resolve border  
disputes with China, Akaev proposed ceding 30 percent of the disputed border 
section (approximately 95,000 hectares) along the Uzgen-Kuush River (of the 
Osh Region) to China. On 10 May, parliament had ratified the 1999 border 
accord and protesters demanded the concessions be rescinded. (EURASIANET, 
14 May 02; via eurasianet.org and INTERFAX, 0727 GMT, 13 May 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0513, via World News Connection) 
 
Other factors influencing the sense of dissatisfaction include a decreasing 
standard of living as well as a perceived absence of regional political 
representation. The north-south division is of long standing and was apparent in 
the 1990 Osh Conflicts and in political appointments made by Bishkek. The 
legitimacy of Akaev's presidency was questioned when he ran for a third term -- 
despite a two-term constitutional limit (it was argued that his first term did not 
count since he was acting as president when the constitution was ratified) -- and 
the exclusion of Kulov and other opposition leaders influenced unrest and 
dissatisfaction in the government. Combined with the overly forceful oppression 
of the Aksy protests, the threat to political stability in the country is increasing and 
the need for reform and more inclusive north-south representation is becoming 
ever more critical. 
 
[EDITOR'S NOTE: At press time, as demonstrations continued, the government 
of Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev resigned. President Akaev has promised to 
include opposition leaders in the new government.] 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
LATVIA  
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Vike-Freiberga triumphant in election law struggle with parliament 
On 9 May the Latvian Saeima adopted two bills that change Latvian election law 
and remove one of the few issues subject to lingering international criticism. Bills 
1258 and 1259 effectively abolished the language proficiency requirements for 
persons seeking election to national and municipal offices. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 
9 May 02; via lexis-nexis). The new legislation was applauded by many within the 
international community, including the United States, which released a statement 
from the embassy in Riga shortly after parliament's decision: "We are 
encouraged by Latvia's continuing efforts to achieve a society that in unified, 
tolerant, generous and open to all who believe and share in the nation's future. 
We believe Latvia is on the right path," the statement said. (US EMBASSY 
PRESS RELEASE, 9 May 02; via www.usis.bkc.lv) 
 
The new legislation represents a significant victory for President Vaira Vike-
Freiberga, who has been engaged in a protracted political battle with the Saeima 
over this issue. At the urging of the international community, she pursued an 
aggressive policy seeking to amend the law in order to enhance Latvia's 
democratic image and to bolster its attempts to gain membership to the EU and 
NATO. Opportunity arose for the passage of new election legislation in the wake 
of a European Court of Human Rights award of 9,000 euros to former 
parliamentary candidate Ingrida Podkolzina, who was removed from the ballot 
due to an apparent lack of fluency in the Latvian language. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 
18 Apr 02; via lexis-nexis) The decision influenced public opinion and convinced 
a sufficient number of MPs to guarantee the outcome of the new legislation.  
 
Podkolzina's case was a breakthrough case because of the manner in which she 
was removed from the ballot. It is alleged that Podkolzina's valid language 
certificate was rendered void only after she had voiced support for the National 
Harmony Party, which supports the cause of ethnic Russians within Latvia. After 
she could not complete a make-up exam administered by an official from the 
state language center, she was removed from the ballot.  
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However, the debate concerning the election law had started long before the 
Podkolzina case. Last year, Vike-Freiberga began advocating the abolition of the 
language requirement. The president said that she did not consider an 
amendment to the election law a threat to Latvia's right to have one official state 
language, but felt that an amendment would bring Latvia into conformity with 
NATO and European standards of government. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 15 Feb 02; 
via lexis-nexis) Although Vike-Freiberga was able to persuade Prime Minister 
Andris Berzins of the need for a state language commission to investigate 
Latvian language protection policies and to open debate on the election laws, 
she was unable to convince the Saeima that a change was needed.  
 
The Saeima sought a political solution which would allow MPs to maintain a 
strong stance on the role of the official state language while capitulating on the 
election laws. On 30 April, the parliament found a path towards this and passed a 
series of constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening the role of the Latvian 
language within the state. The amendments formulated an oath of office for 
elected officials, established Latvian as the working language for parliament and 
state institutions, and noted that municipal governments are elected by citizens 
rather than residents. (BNS, 1403 GMT, 30 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0430, via 
World News Connection) This allowed parliament members to proceed with the 
abolition of the language requirement for elections without losing the support of 
their more nationalistic constituencies.  
 
The vote was forced through rapidly as the Saeima recognized the urgency of 
the issue in view of the May NATO conference in Reykjavik. (MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESS RELEASE, 9 May 02; via www.am.gov.lv) Given 
NATO Secretary-General George Robertson's repeated denunciation of the 
election laws, the Saeima wanted to demonstrate to NATO that Latvia took this 
situation seriously.  
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This gave Latvia a political boost as the NATO foreign ministers met for the last 
time before the Prague Summit that will decide on the accession of new 
members to NATO. 
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